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Beneﬁts to elite schools and the formation of expected returns
to education: Evidence from Mexico City
Ricardo Estrada and Jérémie Gignoux∗
February 2014
Abstract
We study the eﬀects of admission into elite public high schools in Mexico City on students'
expected earnings, arguing these eﬀects provide an indication of the value-added those schools pro-
duce. Using data for the centralized and exam-based allocation of students into schools and an
adapted regression discontinuity design strategy, we ﬁnd that admission substantially increases learn-
ing achievement, and also the future earnings and returns students expect from a college education,
but no eﬀect on the earnings expected with high school education alone. This suggests that students
believe that the beneﬁts from their elite education are complements to a college education.
JEL: D83, D84, I21.
Keywords: elite high schools, earnings expectations, returns to education, beliefs formation.
1 Introduction
The beneﬁts to attending selective high schools are in debate; at least, no clear pattern emerges from the
literature on the eﬀect of selective secondary schools on academic achievement. Selective schools seem to
produce learning gains in some low- and middle-income countries (see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013)
using data from Romania, Jackson (2010) for Trinidad and Tobago, and Ding and Lehrer (2007) for
China), but not in others (Lucas and Mbiti (2014) for Kenya). In the United States, results are clearly
less optimistic (see Cullen et al. (2006) on Chicago public schools and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) on New
York and Boston exam schools) and a similar story goes for the UK (Clark (2010)). These mixed results
are at odds with the sustained demand, from parents and students, that generates school selectivity and
motivate a more comprehensive investigation of the beneﬁts associated to selective schools.
∗Estrada: Paris School of Economics (PSE), 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, restrada@pse.ens.fr. Gignoux: PSE
and French National Institute for Research in Agronomy (INRA), 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, gignoux@pse.ens.fr.
We are grateful to François Bourguignon, Denis Cogneau, Julie Cullen, Francisco Ferreira, Julien Grenet, Marc Gurgand,
Rafael de Hoyos, Katja Kaufmann, Karen Macours and Sylvie Lambert for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Insightful
comments were also received at seminars at the Paris School of Economics, Gothenburg University, and ZEW Mannheim
University, and at the ECINEQ, LACEA, ESPE, EALE, ESSLE and EUDN conferences. We thank the staﬀ at the Mexican
Ministry of Education for kindly providing us access to data. We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from Cepremap.
Estrada also whishes to acknowledge funding from CONACYT.
1
ha
ls
hs
-0
09
51
76
3,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
6 
Fe
b 
20
14
One indication of the value-added that elite schools produce is the causal eﬀect of attending such a
school on graduating students' expected earnings. Intuitively, this eﬀect is the diﬀerence between the
wage that a student graduating from an elite institution expects to have at a given moment in the future
and the wage that the same student would have expected to have if she would have attended a non-elite
school. Hence, the wage premium of an elite education summarizes the students' valuation of the overall
beneﬁts obtained through their education  e.g. augmented skills, prestige of the school's diploma, access
to networks, etc.  in terms of expected earnings in the labor market.
In addition to being informative about school quality, the causal eﬀect of elite schools on students'
expected earnings matters because, through changes in the expected returns to education, schools can
shape educational choices and labor market outcomes. Human capital theory states that schooling deci-
sions depend on the monetary beneﬁts (along with the non-monetary ones) that youth expect from higher
attainment. But Manski's (1993) assertion that it is the heterogeneous returns perceived by students that
inﬂuence educational decisions spurred a growing literature which documents the link between perceived
returns and educational investments. For instance, in the Mexican context, Attanasio and Kaufmann
(2009) ﬁnd that higher expected returns among high school graduates predicts higher college attendance
(see also Jensen (2010) on Dominican Republic, Nguyen (2008) on Madagascar and Arcidiacono et al.
(2012) and Zafar (2013) on choice of college major in the U.S.).
There are several ways in which elite schools might aﬀect youths' perceived returns to education. A
common concern is that some students  particularly those from a disadvantaged background  may have
imperfect information on labor market opportunities and underestimate their real returns to education.
In a pioneering study, Jensen (2010) ﬁnds that 8th graders in the Dominican Republic signiﬁcantly
underestimate returns to education. Providing information about higher measured returns to a random
subset of students leads to higher perceived returns and school completion among these students. Hence,
elite schools could give students access to more precise information on the returns to education, either
through interactions with peers from more privileged backgrounds or through informational activities at
school. In our context, Mexico City, we do not ﬁnd evidence that high school students underestimate
the returns to education. On average, students' perceived returns to college are close to the Mincerian
college premium estimated from current workers' earnings. Still, it is possible that some students from
disadvantaged backgrounds have biased estimations of their (speciﬁc) returns to education and update
their beliefs when exposed to a privileged school environment.
Importantly, admission into elite schools can have an impact on students' expected earnings and
returns to education even in a model with youth correctly informed on earnings. First, following human
capital theory, if these are also better schools, elite schools could boost learning achievement and, in this
way, wage expectations. Higher achievement translates into higher earnings expectations if students view
scholastic learning (e.g. productivity) as a direct determinant of future earnings or an input for obtaining
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a more valuable higher education diploma. The same logic applies to the accumulation of non-cognitive
skills that enter in the formation of earnings expectations, such as self-conﬁdence or leadership. Note
that the perceived returns to college are the diﬀerence between the wages expected with a college and a
high school education. Hence, in this model, a positive eﬀect of schools on expected returns requires that
the expected wage premium of the augmented skills increases with educational attainment.
Second, in line with a signaling model, the higher reputation of elite schools, and the diploma they
award, may give their graduates a signal of higher productivity. In general, this signal could increase the
expected earnings either directly in the labor market  with access to better paid jobs  or by facilitating
the admission into more selective universities. The later mechanism is likely to be limited in our setting,
though, as admission into the most prestigious public universities in Mexico is based on standardized
exams. Also consistent with a model of asymmetric information in the labor market, elite schools could
give students access to formal or informal networks that lead to better employment opportunities. As in
the previous model, the eﬀect on the expected returns to college depends on the expected beneﬁts from
the school's diploma and networks in the labor market for college and high school graduates.
In this paper, we examine the eﬀect of admission into the National Polytechnic Institute (Instituto
Politécnico Nacional or IPN), a system of 16 elite high schools of Mexico City Metropolitan area. Com-
pared to other public high schools, IPN schools give students access to a set of enhanced inputs, including
higher achieving peers, but also more qualiﬁed teachers, smaller class sizes and more IT equipment. IPN
admission is also correlated with better outcomes in the short and long run. IPN students score higher on
the high school completion scholastic test, are more likely to attend college and have better labor market
outcomes.
First, we document that IPN students have higher expected returns to college than students from other
public high schools, even when controlling for learning achievement and other individual characteristics.
Then, we identify the causal eﬀect of elite schools on expected wages and returns to college using a
quasi-experimental setting with a panel database of students followed from application to the high school
to graduation. For causal inference, we exploit the allocation of students into high schools based on a
common exam and a regression discontinuity (RD) design analysis. Methodologically, our RD design
estimates depart from the approach followed in previous studies, notably Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011)
and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013), by identifying the eﬀect of marginal admission to the IPN system
rather than to a speciﬁc IPN school.
We ﬁnd that admission to an elite high school system increases substantially both the returns expected
from a college education, with point estimates of about 19 percent points on the expected college premium,
and scholastic achievement, with a jump of about .3 standard deviations. IPN students beneﬁt from higher
school inputs and acquire more valuable skills. However, the observed association between achievement
and perceived returns suggests that the higher expected returns cannot stem uniquely from gains in
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learning achievement. Thus, IPN elite schools aﬀect also perceived returns either by providing information
on the returns, improving the access to valuable networks in the labor market for college graduates, or
by enhancing non-cognitive skills that determine the perceived returns to college.
We do not ﬁnd higher eﬀects, though, on the expectations of students from a more disadvantaged
background, which suggests that interactions with peers from a diﬀerent background (or other mechanisms
aﬀecting in diﬀerent ways richer and poorer students) are not explaining our results.1
Finally, admission into the IPN system increases substantially the expected earnings conditional on
having a college education  with point estimates from 12% to 23%  but has no eﬀect on the earnings
expected with only a high school education. This suggests that graduating students believe that the
valuable beneﬁts associated to their elite high school education are complementary inputs for a college
education.
Our results contribute to the literature on selective high schools by producing evidence on student
outcomes beyond academic achievement. In the United States, Cullen et al. (2006) look at several
behavior outcomes (like disciplinary incidents and arrest rates) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) at
college admission patterns. Studies in developing countries with a good causal identiﬁcation focus more
in student achievement or schooling completion  as do Dustan et al. (2012), who use the same dataset
we have. In an inﬂuential paper, Black (1999) uses variation in housing prices around school district
boundaries in the United States to identify parental valuation of schools with higher achieving students.
We use a diﬀerent approach to estimate the valuation that students at the end of high school put on the
elite education they got  which includes access to higher achieving peers, but also to other improved
inputs.
We also provide evidence on the formation of the perceived returns to education, an area which remains
poorly understood. In a recent study, Sequeira et al. (2013) ﬁnds that receiving a fellowship awarding
academic performance increases girls' perceived returns to college in India, apparently by enhancing
the perception that eﬀort begets economic success. Also related, Battaglia and Lebedinski (2013) ﬁnd
evidence of role model eﬀects on parental perceived returns in a remedial education program for primary
school-age Roma children. Ours is the ﬁrst paper that presents causal eﬀects of school environments on
expected earnings and returns to college.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 documents the diﬀerences in access to school inputs and
earnings expectations between IPN and other students. Section 3 discusses the allocation of students
into high schools and presents the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Section 5 reports and
discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes.
1We nevertheless ﬁnd in the descriptive analysis that in our context, conditional on academic achievement, students from
a disadvantaged background tend to expect  perhaps rationally  slightly lower returns to college than more privileged
youth. This is consistent with the observations of Delaney et al. (2011).
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2 Mexico City elite high schools and earnings expectations
2.1 IPN elite schools
We study the eﬀect of admission into any of the 16 high schools of the National Polytechnic Institute
(Instituto Politécnico Nacional or IPN), a system of elite high schools.2 Admission into IPN schools
follows a centralized process shared with most public high schools of Mexico City, based on a common
exam (and explicit school choices).3 IPN schools provide general high school education with a scientiﬁc
and technical background. IPN is also the main public technological higher education institution in
Mexico, but attendance of an IPN high school does not grant access to the IPN higher education institute.
Less than 10% of public high school students of Mexico City are able to attend an IPN school.4
Admission to an IPN school provides access to a set of enhanced inputs compared to other public
high schools. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for school inputs in IPN and non-IPN schools (based on
information from the Mexican census of schools). Being selected among the best applicants, IPN students
tend to have school peers who are high-achieving and from a more privileged background. Students'
average score at the common entry exam is almost 1.7 standard deviations higher in IPN schools than
in non-IPN schools, and the dispersion of achievement is lower, with an average school-level test score
spread of .53 (unconditional) standard deviations versus .62 in other high schools.5 Table 1 also shows
that more IPN teachers have a college degree (86%) than teachers in other schools (81%), and that IPN
teachers are more often in a full-time position (29%) than teachers in other schools (13%).6 Furthermore,
IPN schools tend to have smaller class sizes (with an average of 39.6 students per class versus 41.6 in
non-IPN schools) and much better access to computers (with 3.5 students per computer versus 9.8 in
non-IPN schools).
Not surprisingly, IPN students achieve better outcomes in the medium and long run. Table 2 gives
regression estimates of correlations between attendance of, and graduation from, an IPN high school and
1) scores in an achievement test at the end of senior high school and 2) higher education and job market
outcomes among individuals aged 23 to 35 years old who graduated from a public senior high school in
Mexico City. (It uses data from the Enlace test at high school completion and the ENTELEMS labor
force survey). IPN students obtain better scores at high school completion than students in non-elite
public high schools with a gap in mathematics and Spanish, respectively, of 1.4 and 1 standard deviations.
2There are ten institutional systems of senior public high schools in Mexico City Metropolitan Area. IPN along with
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) system stand out from the rest. Our data does not allow us to
investigate the eﬀects of attending a UNAM school though because UNAM students do not take the Enlace test at high
school completion and thus drop out of our panel.
3We describe this process in Section 3.
4In 2005, the cohort among whom our data was collected, IPN schools admitted 19,042 applicants of the Mexico City
centralized admission process, while other public high schools admitted 210,468. This number includes 34,625 students
admitted to UNAM schools, but our analysis will focus on the eﬀects of admission to an IPN versus a non-elite (and
non-UNAM) school. Hence, we exclude UNAM students from all ﬁgures from here on.
5Besides, as discussed below, IPN students have higher expectations than youth in other schools of the wages they would
achieve with a college education.
6However, IPN teaching might not necessarily beneﬁt all students as teachers may target speciﬁc (likely majoritarian)
groups of students (Duﬂo et al. (2011)).
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Along the same lines, IPN graduates are more likely to attend college, with a diﬀerential of 34 percentage
points compared to a baseline college attendance of 32%, and to achieve better outcomes on the labor
market. IPN graduation is correlated with higher labor market participation (by 13.5 percentage points),
lower unemployment (by 6 percentage points), and higher hourly wages (by 51%).
A number of studies have examined whether attending an elite school causally explains those better
outcomes. Those studies have generally focussed the eﬀects that transit through has on gains in scholastic
learning. To account for a broader set of beneﬁts from elite schools, we examine their eﬀects on the wages
and returns to college education that students expect after having completed their secondary education.
2.2 Wage expectations diﬀerentials across attended systems of high schools
To investigate the eﬀects of attending an elite high school on expected wages and returns to college, we use
data from a survey answered by a representative sample of students in the last year of high school, when
they take the national Enlace achievement test. The survey gathers information on students' background,
schooling experience and expected wages (we provide more details on this Enlace survey below.)7
Two questions elicit the information about the earnings expected with given educational attainments.
Youth are asked questions about their expected future earnings under two scenarios: that they terminate
their schooling after completing high school and that they continue their studies and obtain a university
degree. The answers are given using a pre-codiﬁed set of brackets. The questions are the following:
1. If you do not obtain a university degree, what monthly income do you expect to have on average
ﬁve years from now?
2. If you obtain a university degree, what monthly income do you expect to have on average ﬁve years
from now?
The earnings brackets for both questions are: i) $4,000 or less; ii) $4,001 to $7,000; iii) $7,001 to $10,000;
iv) $10,001 to $15,000; v) $15,001 to $20,000; and vi) more than $20,000.8 Those are measures of
expectations ﬁve years from the moment of the survey, at which point individuals would be about 23
years old.
The survey asks about the average expected earnings, and we can obtain for each individual a point
estimate of his expected earnings with high school and college education, as well as of the expected college
premium. To obtain a measure of the implied expected college premium, we assume that each discrete
earnings category corresponds to the mean of the two values that deﬁne each bracket. For the ﬁrst and
last bracket, which do not have an obvious interval, we assume that the brackets are, respectively, [$3,000
7We present in more details the subjective expectations data we use, its interests and limitations, and conduct a number of
consistency checks, in Appendix A1. For more information about the measurement of subjective expectations in developing
countries, see surveys by Attanasio, 2009 and Delavande et al., 2011.
8In 2008, 7.5 Mexican pesos ($) were equivalent to 1 US dollar in terms of purchasing power parity (OECD).
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$4,000] and [$20,000$27,000]. Then, the implied college premium, or expected returns to college, is given
by the diﬀerence between log expected college earnings and log expected senior high school earnings:
expected returns = log (expected earnings | college)− log (expected earnings | high school).
The online appendix shows that the measures of the expected returns to college are comparable to
the returns that can be estimated with a OLS wage equation using survey data on actual wages of
young individuals in the Federal District and State of Mexico. Furthermore, the diﬀerentials associated
with individual and family characteristics are rather expected, with higher returns to college expected by
students with higher learning achievements at 15 years old and by children of more educated, white-collar
and wealthier parents.
We are primarily interested in diﬀerentials between the elite and non-elite school systems. Figure 1
Panel A plots the conditional means of expected earnings, given learning achievement, with respectively
a high school and a college education for students of IPN and the other (non-elite) schools, while Panel
B plots the corresponding conditional means of the expected returns to college.
Several patterns emerge. The ﬁrst result, in Figure 1 Panel A, is that, even at similar levels of
achievement at high school completion, IPN students tend to have higher expected earnings with a
college education than students from non-elite schools. The conditional means are taken for each decile
of the distribution of achievement and the graphs include lower and upper bounds of 95% conﬁdence
intervals. Earnings expectations of IPN students are 10% to 20% higher than those of non-IPN students.
The diﬀerentials are clear across deciles. We observe also that the expected earnings of both groups tend
to increase with scholastic achievement.
Second, see also Figure 1 Panel A, there are no clear diﬀerences in the earnings expected with only
a high school education between IPN and non-IPN students. The IPN students have slightly higher
expectations, but the 95% conﬁdence intervals do not reject the hypothesis that those expectations are
equal. Importantly, the factors that make IPN students expect higher wages with college seem not to
operate in the labor market for high school graduates. Similarly, while the slopes of the conditional
expectation functions for earnings with college follow an upward trend, the ones for earnings with high
school are ﬂat, indicating that students believe that the return to scholastic achievement in the labor
market for high school graduates is small or insigniﬁcant.
In consequence of the two previous results, as shown in Figure 1 Panel B, IPN students tend to expect
higher returns of attending college than non-IPN students, again after conditioning on achievement, with
a diﬀerence of 5% to 15% that is marginally signiﬁcant in the right end of the achievement distribution.
IPN students in the left tail also have higher expectations, but there are few low-achievers among IPN
students and the corresponding conditional means are imprecise.9
9The Appendix shows similar graphs for the dispersion, measured by the coeﬃcient of variation (CV) of the earnings
expectations of students in IPN and non-IPN schools conditional on learning achievements (for each decile). Expectations
of earnings with college tend to be less dispersed among students in IPN schools, with a value of the CV lower by about .005
at all deciles except the fourth. Earnings expectations tend to be also less dispersed at higher levels of achievements. There
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Table 3 reports OLS regression estimates to test if the observed diﬀerentials in expectations between
IPN and non-IPN students persist after controlling for family and individual characteristics. The out-
comes are logarithms of expected earnings and returns to college. The gaps between IPN and non-elite
school students in expected earnings with college and returns to college remain with the controls. The
estimates indicate that IPN students tend to expect both higher earnings with college (by 8%) and re-
turns to college (by 6 percentage points). The diﬀerence in earnings with only high school is small (2%)
and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, these descriptive results indicate that IPN students expect higher earnings if attending college
than students of non-elite schools at similar levels of scholastic achievement. Unless it is entirely driven
by selection into school systems, this pattern suggests that the attendance of an IPN school has some
value on the labor market conditional on obtaining a college degree.
We discussed in the introduction that elite schools could shape students' expected earnings through
access to better information, an increase in human capital and a signaling (or access to networks) eﬀect.
We can derive testable predictions that are consistent with the two ﬁrst mechanisms. A pure information-
provision mechanism implies both that disadvantaged students underestimate their returns to education
and that IPN schools, with more informed peers or direct informational activities, correct this downward
bias. We can check then if  given similar gains in achievement  the perceived returns to college of youth
with less educated parents increase more than those of their more privileged peers given, exogenous, IPN
admission. 10 However, the expectations data do not show evidence of underestimation of returns even
among the sample of non-elite high school graduates.
If students are suﬃciently informed about the labor-market value of the education they received, gains
in earnings expectations should reveal increases in skills (or in awareness of own ability). In a human
capital model, the eﬀect of attending an elite high school on expected earnings should be positively
associated with the school eﬀect on the accumulation of cognitive or non-cognitive skills. We show in
Table 1 that, when compared to other high schools, IPN schools provide to their students a set of enhanced
inputs. Whether IPN (or more generally elite) schools can translate higher levels of inputs into enhanced
students' skills is ultimately an empirical question that we also investigate.11
We return to these predictions in the empirical analysis below.
Now, the selection of students with higher earnings expectations into elite high schools could also
are also smaller gaps in the dispersion of expected earnings with high school and college premium, although the dispersion
of expected college premium is lower among IPN students at most deciles.
10Although we only have anecdotal evidence on this, IPN schools may engage in activities to provide information to
students on the returns to higher education. Also, given their institutional relations with the IPN higher education institute,
the administrative and teaching personnel may have information on the job opportunities and wages, notably in the scientiﬁc
and manufacturing sectors, that could be communicated to their students.
11Note that the predicted eﬀect of elite schools on achievement might depend on students' background. On the one hand,
attending a more selective school could have adverse eﬀects on skill acquisition for students who could get marginalized
either because of lower relative scores (that could make the teaching in those schools less suitable for them) or because
they belong to a socioeconomic minority in the school they attend (e.g. from poor neighborhoods). On the other hand,
some empirical studies (like Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011)) have found that gains from attending very selective schools in
the United States are larger for (if not restricted to) ethnic minorities.
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drive the observed diﬀerences, if unobserved characteristics are correlated with the likelihood to attend
IPN schools. To address this concern, we use the local natural experiments generated by the process
of assignment of students into schools to identify the causal eﬀects of admission into an elite IPN high
school.
3 Data
3.1 The Comipems application system
The Metropolitan Commission of Public Senior-Secondary Education Institutions (Comipems) oversees
nine of the ten systems of public high schools in Mexico City metropolitan area.12 Since 1996, Comipems
manages the allocation of students to high schools through a single process based on students' schooling
choices and scores on a common exam, and the numbers of slots available in each school. The matching
of students to schools follows the serial dictatorship algorithm (Pathak, 2011).
The matching process operates, more speciﬁcally, in the following way. First, before taking the
exam, applicants submit their ranking of preferred school choices (we use the terms of choice set for
simpliﬁcation). The numbers of available seats are submitted by schools before students formulate these
choices, and schools do not submit any priority criteria over students. Students can select up to 20
schooling options (from 634 options in 2005). They actually submit a list of preferred tracks as some
schools oﬀer more than one track. We use the term school as synonymous of track, though, because
most schools, notably IPN schools, have only one track at the time of admission. In practice, students
receive at school an application package (to take home) in January of their last year of junior high school.
Applicants must turn in their registration form (with their ranked sets of chosen schools) in February or
March of the same year.
Second, applicants take a common standardized exam in the last weekend of June. All applicants
with at least 31 correct answers out of 128 questions in the exam are allowed to register in a Comipems
school. 13
In the third step, students are allocated to schools. In practice, the Mexican Center of Evaluation
of Education (Ceneval) uses a computer program that ranks students according to their exam score and
proceeds to allocate individuals to the school with available seats they ranked the highest in their choice
sets of preferred schools. As some schools are oversubscribed, not all applicants are admitted into their
12A recent system of high schools administered by the Federal District government and targeted to low-achieving stu-
dents does not belong to Comipems. The Metropolitan area includes the Federal District and 22 municipalities from the
neighboring State of Mexico.
13Applicants who list a school from the UNAM system must take an exam version designed by this institution, while
all the other students take an exam design designed by Ceneval (the institution in charge of the assignment process).
Both exams are designed to be equivalent in level of diﬃculty. We do not have information to suggest that some students
might prefer taking one version of the test to strategically increase the probability of gaining admission into one of their
ﬁrst choices. We show in the empirical analysis that (marginal) admission into the IPN system is not correlated with the
probability of taking the UNAM version of the Comipems exam.
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preferred option(s). In 2005, only one third of applicants gained admission into their ﬁrst-choice school.
Finally, students who only chose schools that happened to be too selective with respect to their test
scores, i.e. who miss the admission cutoﬀs for all their listed choices, can register in the schools with
remaining slots in a second-stage allocation process. In 2005, this was the case for 19% of the applicants.
Note that, in this system, schools are free to determine the number of seats they open, but afterwards
simply apply the admission list produced by Ceneval based on students' stated choices and exam ranks.
Neither schools' admission of students nor students' ranking of schools aﬀects the priority that students
have in the allocation process. Hence, no complex choice strategies would help students increase their
probabilities of being admitted into their top choices. Under the serial dictatorship allocation mechanism,
students' dominant strategy is to list their chosen schools in a way that is consistent with their true
preferences, assuming students are not constrained in the number of schools they can list (Pathak (2011)).
This later assumption seems satisﬁed here as, in 2005, the applicants from Federal District junior high
schools submitted 9.2 schooling options on average and only 2% listed the maximum number of options
allowed (which is 20).
The combination of the institutional setting and students' preferences produces a set of admission
thresholds which are determined ex-post and cannot be predicted beforehand  where an oversubscribed
school's admission threshold or cutoﬀ is the exam score of the last student admitted to the school. As
students tend to prefer schools with higher inputs, schools with higher admission thresholds oﬀer on
average better school inputs. As we discuss below, these admission thresholds generate variation in the
allocation of students into schools that can be considered as locally random and exploited for identifying
the causal eﬀects of admission to more selective high schools.
3.2 Datasets
The data we use matches information from the 2005 Comipems admission process to information both
from the 2008 and 2009 national achievement test (Enlace) of 12th graders of all high schools and from
the 2008 and 2009 versions of a questionnaire survey of a representative sample of students who took the
same Enlace test. It thus forms a panel dataset in which students are followed from application in 2005
up to graduation from high schools in 2008 or 2009 (unless they drop out before  we document this
in depth below). We also match to this panel of students, information on the schools they attend from
the 2005 version of the annual census of high schools carried out by the Secretary of Education (called
Formato 911).
The main outcomes of interest are measured in 2008 and 2009, as the cohort of 2005 Comipems
applicants graduate from high school. The Mexican Evaluation of Scholastic Achievement of Educational
Institutions (Enlace) is a national standardized exam taken, since 2008, by students in the last year
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of senior-secondary education (12th grade).14 The purpose of the examination is to evaluate schools,
and the educational system as a whole, and hence it has no bearing for students on graduation or
university admissions. However, Enlace results are widely reported by media outlets and nongovernmental
organizations in Mexico, and are used as the principal input for the creation of school league tables. The
publicity provides school agents with incentives to perform better and makes Enlace a medium-stake
test.15
In parallel to the Enlace exam and on the same day, the Federal Ministry of Education conducts a
complementary survey among a random sample of students, gathering information on their individual
characteristics, family background, and schooling experience.
All four datasets (Comipems 2005, Enlace 2008 and 2009 tests and surveys, and 2005 census of schools)
can be matched at the individual level, and this was done by the Ministry of Education ('Secretaría de
Educación Pública') data administration teams. The Comipems and Enlace datasets are matched using,
in this order, the national population identiﬁcation code (CURP), combinations of CURP and name when
the former is incomplete, and the name and birth date when there are missing values for the CURP. The
matching between the Enlace exam and the survey results is straightforward using the exam identiﬁcation
code (available for all observations in both datasets). The school census information is recovered for the
speciﬁc schools students attend using school identiﬁers. We return to sample sizes below.
The datasets contain the following information. The Comipems database includes the submitted
listing of choices (tracks and schools), the score at the entry exam, the assignment outcome for all
applicants, and also some family background information from a questionnaire attached to the registration
form. The Enlace dataset contains the exam scores for all 12th graders. We normalize the scores for
mathematics and Spanish language sections by exam cohort with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the
sample of matched 2005 Comipems applicants. The additional survey conducted at Enlace exam taking
provides information on students' background and experience in high school, expected wages conditional
on schooling levels and aspirations to pursue further education. Finally, the school census data provides
information on the characteristics of schools, in particular: class size, teachers' proﬁle and information
technology equipment.
3.3 Samples
The Comipems process concerns most applicants to public senior-secondary schools in the Mexico City
Metropolitan area. Excluding students admitted to UNAM schools (as we will from here on), 220,659
eligible applicants took the Comipems exam in 2005 (another 24,999 took the exam, but did not complete
junior high on time). 195,802 (88.7%) applicants were allocated to 620 tracks. 2.3% of applicants did not
achieve the minimum required score on the exam to access senior secondary education and 9.0% were
14Enlace exams are also taken by students at other grades.
15Students enrolled in UNAM schools do not take Enlace and, hence, are not considered in our analysis.
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not admitted to any of their listed options and did not use the second-stage process to select a school
with remaining seats. The pool of applicants includes students currently enrolled at junior high schools
in the Federal District (34.0%) and in the participating localities from the State of Mexico (40.0%), but
also youth who graduated in previous years (23.7%), who attend schools in other localities (1.7%) and
students of special adult-education institutions (0.6%).
For estimating the eﬀects of IPN admission, we focus on a restricted sample of 2005 Comipems
applicants a) who graduated in the academic year 2004-2005 from a junior high school of the Federal
District and b) who applied to at least one IPN school and were either admitted or rejected from such
school.
We exclude returning-to-school and special adult-education students because they have lower chances
of completing senior-secondary schooling and likely diﬀerent responses to IPN admission. Similarly, as 15
of the 16 IPN high schools are located within the Federal District, we omit students from the neighboring
State of Mexico. These restrictions reduce the sample to 75,137 applicants.
The restriction to eligible applicants of IPN schools is required because our identiﬁcation strategy
compares the outcomes of admitted and rejected IPN applicants and it reduces the sample to 18,523
applicants at the Comipems exam (baseline)  7,783 admitted IPN applicants and 10,740 rejected. We
explain formally our deﬁnition of rejected IPN applicants in Section 4. Intuitively, a rejected IPN
applicant is one who, with a higher entry exam score, would have been allocated to an IPN school.16
Only a share of the IPN eligible applicants (51.4%) can be matched to the Enlace test in 2008 or
2009 (more on attrition below). This leads to samples of 9,119 students at Enlace test-taking, and 6,358
students (34.3%) at the Enlace complementary survey conducted among a random sub-sample of the
test-takers. Note that applicants can opt for a private school after the admission results, or transfer to
this system during their senior-secondary education. However, only 4.1% of the applicants in our sample
take the Enlace test in a private high school.17
In practice, as we explain below, our estimators only use observations close to the IPN admission
cutoﬀs.
3.4 Attrition
In our sample, attrition between the end of junior high and high school could be caused particularly by
dropping out from school, but also by imperfect matching and Enlace turnout rates.
First, dropping out from high school is a widespread phenomenon in Mexico. In 2010, only 45% of
the 25 to 34-year-old population in the country had completed a high school education. The same year,
16In principle, we omit both applicants with a junior high school GPA lower than 7 out of 10 (as they are not eligible
for IPN admission) and applicants with a Comipems score lower than 31 (as they are not eligible for admission to any
Comipems school). In practice, the restriction to entry scores lower than 31 is redundant in our main estimations, which
use only observations close to the IPN admission cutoﬀs.
17Private schools do not belong to Comipems and manage admission decisions independently.
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according to OECD data, the completion rate among all Mexican students admitted in high school three
years before was 52%. As dropping out is correlated with family background, completion rates should be
higher among students in Mexico City and notably IPN students. According to administrative statistics,
the ratio of graduates in 2007 (regardless of the year of admission) to new entrants in 2004 was 62% in
IPN high schools. As stated above, we observe 51.4% of the 18,253 IPN applicants in the Enlace dataset
at the end of high school (45.7% in 2008 and 5.7% in 2009). This suggests that dropping out explains
the bulk of the attrition between entry and completion of high school and our 2005 and 2008/09 data.
Second, we estimate that matching errors (due to incorrect or imprecise information on CURP, name
and/or birth date) could contribute to overall attrition in our sample by up to 6 points. In the 2008
Enlace-exam database, we observe 13,453 students in Comipems schools who are not matched in the
Comipems data. If all of them were eligible applicants from the 2005 Comipems process, matching errors
would explain 6 points of attrition. However, some of those observations should correspond to students
who did not take the Comipems exam in 2005, e.g. students admitted in 2004 or before or who migrated
into Mexico City after completing the ﬁrst year of senior-secondary education in another region (those
school changes are possible).
Third, some 12th grade students, while still enrolled, could not show up at the Enlace exam. Exam
participation might be aﬀected by random absenteeism; or, more worrisome, some principals, looking
to achieve a higher mean Enlace score in their school, could have encouraged, or at least not deterred,
lower-performing students to skip school the day of the exam. If we approximate the Enlace exam turnout
rate by the ratio of students who took the Enlace exam in Comipems schools in 2008 over the number of
students enrolled in grade 12th reported in the school census at the beginning of the 20072008 academic
year, the average Enlace turnout rate is estimated at 90%. Although dropouts during the year could lead
to overestimate the Enlace turnout, this suggests that incomplete exam turnout could explain up to 5
points of attrition.
To summarize, our back-of-the-envelop calculations suggest that the attrition rate of 48.6% between
the beginning and end of senior secondary education in our sample can be roughly decomposed in the
following way: at least 38% due to school drop-outs, up to 6% to matching errors, up to 5% to incomplete
Enlace turnout, and 3% due to other factors (such as more than one grade repetition). Beyond the overall
composition of attrition, we are interested in verifying that there is no relationship between the treatment
of interest, i.e. admission to an IPN school, and attrition, measured by Enlace exam taking. Before that,
we need to present our identiﬁcation strategy.
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4 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on a regression discontinuity (RD) design and provides estimates of the
eﬀects of admission into the elite IPN system. We focus on the eﬀects of admission to a school system
rather than a single school, thus departing from related studies of school eﬀects, to make the interpretation
of the estimated eﬀects more straightforward. The identiﬁcation of a system-level parameter in an
admission process done at the school level requires some adjustments to the usual RD design strategy,
notably in the deﬁnition of admission cutoﬀs.
4.1 Discontinuities in admission to the IPN school-system
To explicit the strategy, consider a student i who submits a set of ordered school choices Ci = {S1, S2, ..., S20}
(call it the student's 'choice set'), with school Sk, for k = 1, ..., 20, ranked as kth choice. As most students
rank fewer than 20 schools, we can allow for a number of choices at the end of the list of submitted pref-
erences to be blank without any eﬀect on the deﬁnition of admission cutoﬀs and empirical strategy. The
entire admission process (including number of seats in schools, students' applications and exam scores)
generates cutoﬀ scores for admission to all schools as described in section 3.1. Let {c1, c2, ..., c20} denote
the set admission cutoﬀs corresponding to the choice set Ci, where ck, for k = 1, ..., 20, is the admission
cutoﬀ of school Sk.
Note that the ranking of schools in students' choice sets can diﬀer from a ranking of schools by
selectivity, so that less selective schools (with a lower admission cutoﬀ) can be preferred to more selective
ones. Under the allocation mechanism considered, students have the incentive to rank schools in order
of expected utility (Pathak (2011)). So, preferences for geographical location of schools or other school
features could generate a ranking of schools that is not strictly decreasing in admission cutoﬀs. In addition,
even if it was their only choice parameter, students would need to have perfect foresight to produce a
ranking that is consistent with school selectivity since admission cutoﬀs are determined endogenously.
However, when examining a student's allocation to schools, we can disregard schools which are both
more selective and less preferred than any other schools in student i 's choice set, because those choices
will never be relevant for her admission: even if she passes the cutoﬀ for admission into those schools,
she would be allocated to the less selective and preferred school.18 One can thus simplify choice sets by
deleting those choices. We perform this simpliﬁcation in practice in the data. For student i, we can thus
assume, with no loss of generality, that Ci is simpliﬁed so that c1 > c2 > . . . > c20.
Now assume that student i lists at rank K of her (simpliﬁed) choice set, a given IPN school S∗, for
which the admission cutoﬀ is cK = c (S
∗), so that: Ci = {S1, ..., SK = S∗, ..., S20}, with c1 > . . . >
cK−1 > cK = c (S∗) > . . . > c20. Assume in addition that she obtained a score si at the Comipems
18We insist that this simpliﬁcation excludes all choices of schools which are more selective and less preferred than any
other choice, and not only than the school the student was allocated to. Thus it does not introduce any selection above or
below the cK cutoﬀ.
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entry exam. Then student i will be admitted to the IPN school S∗ if her score is equal to or above the
cK = c (S
∗) cutoﬀ score and below the cK−1 one, i.e. if si ∈ [cK = c (S∗) ; cK−1[. This is a school-speciﬁc
admission cutoﬀ.
However, one can also deﬁne some school system-speciﬁc admission cutoﬀs, in particular for admission
to the IPN system. Indeed, for any given simpliﬁed choice set C that includes at least one IPN school,
there is a cutoﬀ score above which a student with choice C would be allocated to an IPN school and
below which the student would be allocated to a non-IPN school (except in cases where no other schools
are listed after IPN schools in the choice set19).
To see this, assume that the choice set Ci of student i is such that the ﬁrst L schools are all IPN
schools and the next ones are all non-IPN schools, i.e.:
Ci =
c1, ..., cL︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ΘIPN
, cL+1, ..., c20︸ ︷︷ ︸
/∈ΘIPN
 (1)
where ΘIPN denotes the set of IPN schools. In this case, the student would be allocated to one of the
IPN schools so long as his score is above the admission cutoﬀ cL of the Lth ranked least selective IPN
school in the choice set, i.e. if si ≥ cL. Formally, for a choice set Ci, one can deﬁne a cutoﬀ score for
admission to the IPN system as the lowest cutoﬀ of the chosen IPN schools:
cIPN = min
{
c (Sk) , Sk ∈ Ci ∩ΘIPN
}
(2)
In practice, for a student admitted to a school of the IPN system, the IPN admission cutoﬀ is obtained
by going down in the choice set (reducing his score in a thought experiment), starting from the school
he was admitted to until reaching the last IPN school before the student would be allocated to a non-
IPN school. The IPN admission cutoﬀ is the one of the last (i.e. less selective) IPN school. Similarly,
for a student who was rejected from all chosen schools of the IPN system, the IPN admission cutoﬀ is
obtained by going up in the choice set (counterfactually increasing his score) starting from the school he
was admitted to until reaching the ﬁrst IPN school. The IPN admission cutoﬀ is the one of that ﬁrst
preferred IPN school.20
Note that, to simplify exposition, we have considered above a choice set in which IPN schools are
always preferred to non-IPN schools, so that the two types of schools do not alternate in the ordered
19In this case, the student would be counterfactually allocated to the second-stage admission process.
20We need to deal with the existence of another system of elite schools, the UNAM system. Choice sets include such
UNAM schools and some students who are not admitted to IPN schools are allocated to an UNAM school. Similarly, some
students are admitted to IPN schools but would enter an UNAM school given a slightly lower score. For those students,
our strategy would identify the eﬀects of admission to one elite system (IPN) versus another (UNAM). In order to focus on
the comparison of admission to an elite school system (IPN) versus admission to a school of a non-elite system, we exclude
these observations (which correspond to 662 students rejected from the IPN system who were allocated to an UNAM school
and 1,582 students admitted to the IPN system who would have been allocated to an UNAM school given a lower score).
In addition, although it would be interesting to test whether the admission to UNAM schools has the same eﬀects as the
admission to IPN schools, as noted above, our data doesn't track UNAM students until high school completion.
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choice set. Two variations can occur which however do not aﬀect the way IPN admission cutoﬀs are
obtained in practice. First, students can list one or several non-IPN schools before any IPN school in
their choice sets, so that:
Ci =
c1, ..., cJ︸ ︷︷ ︸
/∈ΘIPN
, cJ+1..., cL︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ΘIPN
, cL+1, ..., c20︸ ︷︷ ︸
/∈ΘIPN
 (3)
with J non-IPN schools preferred to L− J IPN ones. Only 0.1% of students have such simpliﬁed choice
sets in our data. Our deﬁnition of IPN admission cutoﬀs accommodates such a choice set, pointing at cL
as the relevant cutoﬀ. The only diﬀerence is that, with a score above cJ , the student would be allocated
to a selective non-IPN school. We delete from our dataset the observations of students with such choice
sets and scores above cJ as they cannot serve to identify the eﬀects of admission to the IPN system (they
do not receive the treatment and would not receive it even with a counterfactually higher score). Second,
a slightly more tricky setting occurs when the set of IPN schools is disjoint with non-IPN schools inserted
between IPN schools, i.e.:
Ci =
c1..., cI︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ΘIPN
, cI+1, ..., cJ︸ ︷︷ ︸
/∈ΘIPN
, cJ+1..., cL︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ΘIPN
, cL+1, ..., c20︸ ︷︷ ︸
/∈ΘIPN
 (4)
Such choice sets are also rare in our data, representing about 7% of students admitted to IPN schools.
In this case, one can still identify some intervals of scores over which the student is admitted to the IPN
system (si ∈ [cL, cJ [ or si ≥ cI), but there are now two IPN admission cutoﬀs and the one that is relevant
depends on the actual score achieved at the exam. This does not aﬀect the practical identiﬁcation of
the relevant IPN admission cutoﬀs though: starting from the school the student was allocated to, the
relevant IPN cutoﬀ would be either cI or cL.
In the online appendix we show in detail the IPN admission cutoﬀs for the sample of IPN applicants
and the schools to which students are allocated in case they score below the cutoﬀs. The IPN admission
cutoﬀs are in average 75.5 exam points (with a standard deviation of 7.37) and range from 66 to 99.
Around 36% of the students who were not admitted to the IPN system were allocated to a school system
with a technical background (DGETI and Conalep), 41% to a school system with a general education
focus (Colegio de Bachilleres, DG Bachillerato and SE Edomex), and 26% to the second-stage admission
process.21
The admission process then generates discontinuities in the relation between the students' score and
their admission to an IPN school: students' choices (and the admission process) determine their IPN
admission cutoﬀs, but then the probability that a student is admitted to an IPN school will depend only
on her score and jump from 0 to 1 at her IPN admission cutoﬀ.
21Among those allocated to the second-stage process, 39% chose a general-education high school (Colegio de Bachilleres),
27% a technical-oriented school (DGETI or Conalep) and 33% did not register in any school.
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4.2 Local experiments
Importantly, applicants are not able to manipulate their IPN admission status because, although they can
certainly inﬂuence their entry exam score through eﬀort, they cannot know and/or precisely determine
ex-ante the cutoﬀs and the relative position of their scores with respect to those. This would require both
total control over their own score and perfect knowledge and anticipation of other applicants' scores and
school choices.
To verify this empirically, the top panel of Figure 2 plots the distribution of the distance of students'
scores from the relevant IPN admission cutoﬀs. No discontinuities are apparent at the cutoﬀ (zero) in
that distribution, which conﬁrms local randomness: students who score close to the cutoﬀs are unable to
precisely predict those and manipulate their scores and position to the cutoﬀs.
For another empirical test, Figure 3 plots the means of a series of observable characteristics of IPN
applicants by distance to the IPN admission cutoﬀ. None of those graphs exhibits any clear disconti-
nuity: students scoring just below and above the IPN admission cutoﬀs have similar characteristics (we
check this using estimation techniques below). This provides complementary evidence that admission is
locally random and that IPN applicants are unable to inﬂuence the allocation process and self-select into
treatment.
The discontinuities in allocations to school systems described above make it possible to identify the
eﬀects of admission to a school of the IPN system using a RD design strategy. There are students who
stated some choices C which lead to the same IPN admission cutoﬀs and achieved slightly diﬀerent scores
above and below those cutoﬀs, so that the ones with scores above get admitted to an IPN school and the
others not. We can then identify the eﬀect of IPN admission, for the group of students with choices that
lead to the same IPN admission cutoﬀs, by comparing the outcomes of those who got admitted to the
ones who were rejected. The variations in treatment near the cutoﬀs are as good as random and thus can
serve to unveil a causal eﬀect of admission on given outcomes (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008 and Lee and
Lemieux, 2010). As applicants cannot locally self-select into the IPN system, their expected potential
outcomes if they attended an IPN school or not (i.e. with and without treatment) as a function of exam
scores will be continuous at the cutoﬀ, and a discontinuity in the outcomes can be attributed to the
admission to diﬀerent school systems. For each subsample of students with a same IPN admission cutoﬀ,
the eﬀects of admission into the IPN system will then be given by the discontinuities in later outcomes
at the cutoﬀ. The discontinuities thus provide a set of local experiments which allow us to identify the
eﬀects of IPN admission at diﬀerent admission cutoﬀ scores.
Note that we do not need all treatment and comparison students to have stated the exact same
choice sets for preferred schools. Because whether students' scores fall above or below the cutoﬀs is
locally random, if one considers a suﬃciently narrow interval around the admission cutoﬀ, the structure
of choices (among other characteristics) of the students above and below the cutoﬀs will be identical (or
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balanced) in average, as in a randomized controlled trial, so long as we remain in the neighborhood of
the cutoﬀ.
Furthermore, while their admission to the IPN elite schools system is completely determined by the
relative position of their score compared to the admission cutoﬀs, the probability that students actually
attend this elite schools system will present a discrete jump at the cutoﬀ (from zero below) but may not
be complete above it for two reasons.
First, some students may drop out before or during senior-secondary schooling. Selective attrition
correlated with IPN admission would be particularly problematic for identiﬁcation as it would impair
the comparability at follow-up of students below and above the cutoﬀs. Such attrition would reﬂect
in a discontinuity, at the admission cutoﬀ, in the distribution of the Comipems score among students
completing senior-secondary education. The bottom panel of Figure 2 plots the distribution of the
distance of students' scores from their IPN admission cutoﬀs for the sample of students who completed
high school: the distribution is very similar to the one at baseline (in top panel) indicating no diﬀerential
attrition in our sample. We conduct complementary tests of the presence of diﬀerential attrition in
Section 4.3.
Second, some students can decide not to attend the public school they were allocated to through the
Comipems system and opt instead for a private school, or some could change school after the ﬁrst or
second year of high school. In the online appendix, we plot the probability of taking Enlace in an IPN
school, conditional on taking the exam in 2008 or 2009, by distance to the IPN admission cutoﬀ. The
probability jumps from zero to about .95 at the cutoﬀ. Thus, although some will drop out (see below), the
great majority of IPN admittees who complete senior-secondary schooling do attend an IPN school until
completion. The high but incomplete take-up does not threaten empirical identiﬁcation, but conducts to
an intent-to-treat interpretation of the parameters of interest.
4.3 RD-design estimates
As students with scores above the cutoﬀs are admitted with certainty to an IPN school, the setting is one
of sharp regression discontinuity. We can thus estimate the eﬀects of IPN admission at any cutoﬀ using
local linear regressions. In practice, for a subsample of students with the same IPN admission cutoﬀ c
(as deﬁned above), we restrict the sample to observations with scores in an interval [c− h; c+ h] around
the cutoﬀ and estimate the average eﬀect of IPN admission on an outcome Yi using a single regression.
Denoting di = si − c the distance between a student score and the IPN admission cutoﬀ (the forcing
variable), and Wi = 1 {si ≥ c} = 1 {di ≥ 0} an indicator for his admission to the IPN system, the model
to be estimated is:
Yi = α+ τWi + βdi + γdi.Wi + i (5)
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where βdi and βdi + γdi.Wi are distinct linear control functions for the slopes of the relationship
between scores and outcome Yi on the left- and right-hand sides of the admission cutoﬀ c . The discon-
tinuity in the outcome is obtained by extrapolating those slopes at the cutoﬀ and taking the diﬀerence
between the left- and right-hand extrapolations. The parameter τ captures this discontinuity, and OLS
estimates of Equation (5) are consistent for this parameter.
Now, the sample consists of students who applied and were admitted or rejected to diﬀerent IPN
schools, so that there are multiple IPN admission cutoﬀs c, and our primary parameter of interest is the
average eﬀect of IPN admission over the diﬀerent cutoﬀs. For estimating this parameter, we aggregate
all students with diﬀerent IPN admission cutoﬀs into a single sample, incorporate cutoﬀ ﬁxed-eﬀects in
Equation (5), and estimate the model:
Yic = α+ τWi + δc +
∑
c
1{c}. [βcdi + γcdi.Wi] + i (6)
where δc are ﬁxed eﬀects for the cutoﬀs relevant for each student, 1{c} is an indicator that cutoﬀ
c is relevant for student i, and βcdi andβcdi + γcdi.Wi are now control functions which are speciﬁc
to each diﬀerent cutoﬀ. Identiﬁcation remains within groups of students with the same cutoﬀs, and
the parameter τ now captures the average discontinuity in the outcomes at the cutoﬀs and is again
consistently estimated by OLS. The choice of the bandwidth derives from a tradeoﬀ between bias and
precision: larger bandwidths will increase precision by using more data but may induce more bias by
relying more on the linear extrapolation on the two sides of the cutoﬀ. The Imbens-Kalyanaraman (IK)
optimal bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2011) is a particular solution of this tradeoﬀ obtained
by minimizing the mean squared error; in our data, the IK bandwidth is about 2 and we consider this
as our benchmark. We also use two larger bandwidths of 5 and 10 that allow higher precision. For the
larger bandwidth of 10, in order to reduce extrapolation error, we replace the linear control function by
a quadratic one. In addition, when estimating Equation (6), we cluster the standard errors at the level
of the senior-secondary schools to which students are admitted to allow for common unobserved shocks
at this level.
For those estimates, the sample of 18,523 students who applied and were either admitted or rejected
from an IPN school is reduced by the bandwidths around the IPN admission cutoﬀs. For the three
bandwidths of 2, 5 and 10 points, we have samples of respectively 1,359, 3,206 and 6,356 observations,
and of 6,358, 471, 1,121 and 2,204 observations when restricting to students taking the Enlace survey.
Several points should be noted on those estimates. First, the estimated parameter τ captures the
local eﬀects of IPN admission for marginal IPN admittees. It is the relevant estimator for the eﬀect of a
policy change that would consider a marginal increase in the number of available slots in the IPN elite
school system, with those slots distributed across IPN schools as the existing ones. As already mentioned,
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although it captures the eﬀect of admission (students cannot be oﬀered to choose between two Comipems
schools after the allocation process), it has an intent-to-treat interpretation because students can opt for
a private school, study in another region or leave the education system.
Second, the important feature of our strategy is that we identify the eﬀects of admission to the IPN
system rather than to a speciﬁc IPN school. We do this by considering the cutoﬀ for admission to the
IPN system, which can diﬀer from the cutoﬀ for admission to the speciﬁc school to which admittees were
allocated, and a control group of students who were not admitted to an IPN school. Our estimates diﬀer
from those proposed by several related studies, notably Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), and Pop-Eleches
and Urquiola (2013), who consider school-speciﬁc cutoﬀs and focus on the marginal eﬀects of admission
to a more selective school compared to admission to a less selective school (which can be another elite
school). This makes the interpretation of the estimated eﬀects more straightforward: while other studies
estimate the eﬀects of admission to more selective elite schools, we estimate the eﬀects of admission to
any school of the elite system. In addition, the diﬀerences in schooling environments and received inputs
are more pronounced between school systems than between schools. This approach thus provides more
variation for identifying the eﬀects of school inputs.
4.4 Validity of the RD design at assignment and diﬀerential attrition
We follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) to analyze the validity of the regression discontinuity design, in a
process analog to assess whether the randomization was carried out properly in a randomized experiment.
We have already veriﬁed in Figure 2 that there is no sign of discontinuities in the number of students
with scores just above the IPN admission cutoﬀs, which conﬁrms that individuals have no precise control
over the assignment process.
We now formally test the local balance of baseline covariates across both sides of the IPN admission
cutoﬀs by using a vector of baseline covariates as dependent variables in our main econometric speciﬁ-
cation. We expect the coeﬃcients for treatment not to be diﬀerent from zero if students are not able to
sort above the IPN cutoﬀs. Table 4 (columns 1-3) gives the results of three sets of RD estimates, using
the bandwidth of respectively 2, 5 and 10, for a set of baseline covariates (similar to the one used before)
as dependent variables. We also test the joint signiﬁcance of discontinuities in the full set of covariates
using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). We do not ﬁnd any evidence that any groups of students
sort above the IPN admission threshold, and the results are consistent across speciﬁcations. With one
exception, the admission coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level in any of the nine
regressions reported in each column. The Chi-square test for the discontinuity indicator being zero in all
equations takes high p-values of .607, .803, and .903 using the three bandwidths. This is strong evidence
in support of the locally random-like variation of assignment to treatment.
We discussed in Section 3 the presence of attrition in our sample, due mainly to dropping out from
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school, between the beginning and end of senior-secondary education. We thus need to investigate the
robustness of the RD design to this attrition at Enlace survey-taking. Figure 2 already provided visual
evidence rejecting selective attrition linked to admission into the IPN system. We formally test the
presence of such attrition using RD estimates of the eﬀect of IPN admission on the probabilities of taking
the Enlace exam and answering the Enlace survey. Results are reported in Table 5. The magnitude
of the point estimates is negative but small, of -0.0398 using the bandwidth of 2, and we cannot reject
that IPN admission has zero eﬀect on the probability of taking the Enlace exam. The students of our
sample admitted to IPN schools are thus not more or less likely than the non-admitted ones to drop out
before completing high school. There is no clear-cut prediction of the relationship between IPN admission
and high school completion, e.g. more selective schools might increase the returns from attendance but
also require higher immediate eﬀorts and investments from students. The lack of eﬀects in our data
suggests that overall some countervailing eﬀects balance. A similar result was obtained by Pop-Eleches
and Urquiola (2013) using Romanian data.22
Now, even with no eﬀect of admission into the IPN system on the probability of taking the Enlace
exam on average, some heterogeneous eﬀects across speciﬁc groups could remain possible. This would
happen if, for example, IPN schools are relatively better at keeping in school some types of students,
but are relatively worse at keeping other types. We thus test for the balance of baseline covariates
conditional on taking the Enlace exam. Table 4 (columns 4-6) gives the results of RD estimates (again
for the three bandwidths), together with the SUR joint-signiﬁcance test, of diﬀerences at the cutoﬀ in
the same characteristics used to evaluate the balance of covariates at Comipems assignment. With the
bandwidths of 2 and 5, none of the admission coeﬃcients in the nine equations estimated is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. With the bandwidth of 10, only one discontinuity, for junior high school
GPA, is found statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. However, the SUR tests reject the joint signiﬁcance
for the three bandwidths with p-values of respectively .405, .684 and .196. Thus we fail to reject that all
discontinuities are jointly equal to zero, and overall students below and above the admission thresholds
are not systematically diﬀerent at Enlace taking.
These checks conﬁrm that discontinuities in outcomes at completion of high school can be causally
attributed to the locally exogenous allocation of students, generated by the exam-based allocation process,
to schools of the IPN system.
22This is in contrast with the results recently obtained by Dustan et al. (2012) who ﬁnd that admission to IPN schools
increases the probability to drop out. The diﬀerence can be explained by the samples used. Our sample is restricted to
Comipems applicants from schools of the Federal District, while Dustan et al. (2012) include applicants from neighboring
municipalities. When admitted to IPN schools, the later may be more likely to drop out because all IPN schools (but one)
are located in the Federal District.
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4.5 Admission into IPN and school inputs received
Students who scored above the cutoﬀs and were admitted to an IPN high school are exposed to a diﬀerent
school environment and beneﬁt from diﬀerent school inputs than students who were rejected. Figure 4
plots the averages of a series of school characteristics of by distance to the IPN admission cutoﬀ and
shows that students scoring just below and above the cutoﬀs will experience rather diﬀerent schooling
environments during the following high school years. The graphs suggest that IPN students tend to
be taught by more qualiﬁed and experienced teachers, in smaller class sizes, and have access to more
computers, and probably other school inputs.
To conﬁrm this, Table 6 gives RD design estimates of the eﬀects of admission to an IPN school on
several measures of the inputs received in senior-secondary schools. Consistently with Figure 4, the
estimates indicate that students admitted to IPN schools have on average peers with test scores at the
entry Comipems exam about 1.1 standard deviations higher, but not more or less variable, are taught
by teachers who are 810% more likely to have graduated from college (20% of teachers of non-admitted
students are not college graduates) and 1117% more likely to work full time in the school (21% of teachers
of non-admitted students are in a full-time position). They also beneﬁt from smaller classes by .1 to 1.7
students (although the estimates with the bandwidths of 2 and 10 are not statistically signiﬁcant; non-
admitted students have in average class sizes of 42 students), and from much better access to computers
with about four students per computer (versus 11 for non-admitted students). This conﬁrms that IPN
admittees are exposed to a set of enhanced inputs.
5 Results
5.1 Higher earnings expectations
Panels A to C of Figure 5 plot the local averages of the main outcomes we investigate, the expected
earnings with a high school and college education and the associated college premium. Students admitted
to IPN schools have consistently higher expectations of earnings with college and returns, with marked
discontinuities at the admission cutoﬀ. Table 7 (columns 1-6) reports the RD design estimates of the
eﬀect of IPN admission on the earnings expected with a college and a high school education. Admission
into the IPN system increases the expected earnings associated to a college education. The estimates
of the three local linear regressions show large increases from 1223% (all statistically signiﬁcant at the
5% level). In comparison, average expected earnings below the cutoﬀ are about $14,000 pesos (around
1,900 USD). In contrast, we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect on the wages expected conditional on staying with a
high school education. The magnitude of the point estimates is rather small and the sign changes across
speciﬁcations, from 1% with the bandwidth of 2 to -4%/-6% with the larger ones, and the eﬀects are
never statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect at the 10% level.
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Table 7 (columns 7-9) presents the eﬀect of IPN admission on the returns to college derived from the
expected earnings with a college and a high school education. The regression results conﬁrm that IPN
admission increases the expected returns to college. Compared to average expected returns of about 75%
below the cutoﬀ, the point estimates indicate a large eﬀect of about 18/22 percentage points, and are
very robust to the bandwidth selection. The statistical signiﬁcance diminishes as we restrict the number
of observations in the sample to the bandwidth of 2, but the estimates with the two larger bandwidths
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the point estimate remains unchanged in the smallest
bandwidth, suggesting that bias is negligible in the larger bandwidths estimates.
Thus, our results show that IPN schools increase the earnings expected with a college education, but
not with only a high school degree, which in turn increases the expected returns to college. This suggests
that IPN students believe that only if they attend college can capture the large value-added obtained in
their elite education.
5.2 Higher levels of skills
For understanding the mechanisms through which elite schools aﬀect students' earnings expectations,
one must account for the potential eﬀect of elite schools on learning. Panel D of Figure 5 provides visual
evidence of a discontinuity at the cutoﬀ for achievement in mathematics, and the estimates in Table 8
conﬁrm that admission into the IPN system increases substantially achievement in mathematics at high
school completion. Again, the local regressions show large eﬀects  .30 to .34 standard deviations and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level  for all three bandwidths. On the other hand, we do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on achievement in Spanish, which may reﬂect the emphasis of IPN schools in scientiﬁc
and technical ﬁelds.
Other studies ﬁnd estimates of similar magnitude to the ones we observe for achievement in math-
ematics: Jackson (2010) (.3-.5 standard deviations) working on selective secondary schools in Trinidad
and Tobago, and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) (.5-.15 standard deviations) in Romania.. In contrast,
studies in developed countries (e.g. Cullen et al. (2006), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), and Bui et al.
(2011) for the United States) ﬁnd no eﬀects or a positive eﬀect restricted to minority students. For
instance, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) ﬁnd gains in Boston exam schools (of .17 standard deviations) for
Blacks and Hispanics in English. The gains in achievement in mathematics associated with IPN admis-
sion lie thus in the upper part of the range identiﬁed in the literature, which conﬁrms the capacity of
this elite school system to combine inputs in a meaningful way. Also, the higher gains in mathematics 
as opposed to language  are consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature on charter schools in the U.S.
(see for example Dobbie and Fryer (2013)).
Regarding the formation of earnings expectations, we outlined that, in a human capital model, an
increase in skills (productivity) would induce an increase in the expectation of future earnings. So the
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observation of simultaneous gains in cognitive skills and expected wages with college is compatible with
a human capital model in which students believe (maybe correctly) that the labor markets for college
and high school graduates reward diﬀerently cognitive skills. This explanation is consistent with the
descriptive evidence presented in Figure 1, which suggests that students expect no wage gains from
higher scholastic achievement if they stay with a high school degree.
However, the gains in scholastic skills (in mathematics) are not suﬃcient to explain the higher wages 
conditional on college attendance  expected by IPN students. Going back again to results in Section 2.2,
even after controlling for learning achievement and several individual characteristics, IPN students expect
higher wages if they go to college than non-IPN ones. In addition, the slope of the relationship between
achievement and expected returns (disregarding potential selection) seems too low for the .3 standard
deviation increase in mathematics achievement to explain the approximately 20% increase in expected
returns to college  the correlation coeﬃcient between Enlace test scores in mathematics and expected
returns to college in the 10 bandwidth sample amounts to 2 percentage points in expected returns for a
1 standard deviation increase in mathematics achievement.
The unexplained diﬀerence could stem in part from additional skills not captured by scholastic achieve-
ment. In particular, elite schools could enhance non-cognitive skills such as future-orientedness, self-
conﬁdence, leadership, etc. We do not have a comprehensive set of measures for students' non-cognitive
skills at the end of high school. We construct though two indexes  using principal component analysis 
for students' self-organization and attitude to school using related questions from the Enlace survey. The
conditional expectation functions of both variables on the entry exam score are plotted in Panels F and
G from Figure 5. Table 9 reports the corresponding parametric estimates for the eﬀect of IPN system
admission in these two proxies for non-cognitive skills.
We ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of admission to the IPN system on students' attitude to school. The point
estimates go from .17 to .25 standard deviations and are statistically signiﬁcant (at least at the 10% level)
in two of the three bandwidths (the exception is the bandwidth of 2 exam points). There is no clear eﬀect
on self-organization, though. The point estimates have a positive sign, but their magnitude is smaller 
from .03 to .18 standard deviations  and in none of the three bandwidths are statistically diﬀerent from
zero at the 10% level. Again, for non-cognitive skills to explain the eﬀects of IPN admission on earnings
expectations, we would need the skills to be relevant only conditional on college attendance.
Thus, the higher expected returns to college of IPN students could derive from the acquisition of
additional skills that students value conditional on getting a college education. This would occur if the
skills that elite high schools produce make college attendance more proﬁtable either in terms of learning
(complementarities in skill production) or earnings (complementarities in labor market productivity).
Along these lines, we reported in the descriptive analysis that students seem to believe that the return
to scholastic achievement in the labor market for high school graduates is small or insigniﬁcant, and the
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opposite in the labor market for college graduates. However, the gains in scholastic skills seem insuﬃcient
to explain the increase in expected earnings and returns to college, a gap that may be explained in part
from a better development in IPN schools of other skills, including non-cognitive ones.
5.3 Disadvantaged students and no evidence of imperfect information
We investigate now if students from a disadvantaged background beneﬁt also from admission to the IPN
system and if there might be updating from imperfect information about the returns to college among
these students. In short, we do not ﬁnd evidence of heterogeneities by family background, and notably
students from more disadvantaged backgrounds do not increase their earnings expectations any more
than other students. For instance, the estimates in Table 10, with interaction terms, show that the
eﬀects do not diﬀer by parental education in any of the considered outcomes: youth with more educated
parents beneﬁt in terms of learning achievement, and expected earnings and returns to college as much
as those with less educated parents. Similar results (available from the authors) are obtained using other
background characteristics, such as parental occupation and graduation from a private school at the
junior secondary level.
Thus, students from a disadvantaged background beneﬁt as much as their more privileged peers when
admitted to IPN schools. More speciﬁcally, attendance of IPN schools do not increase the expected
returns to college of disadvantaged youth more than others. We had already mention that the elicited
perceived returns in our sample are close to the estimated returns using actual wages from current workers
in Mexico City (see details in online appendix). Together, both pieces of evidence count against the story
that disadvantaged youth correct their downward-biased perceived returns to education when exposed to
better information in the IPN schools. Hence, an information channel cannot explain the observed gains
in expected returns.
5.4 Higher schooling aspirations
For getting a sense of the long-term eﬀects on students' trajectories associated with admission to an IPN
school, one would ideally want to observe individuals' later outcomes in college (if they attend it) and
on the labor market. Our data does not allow tracking students after high school completion, but the
Enlace survey contains information on the educational attainment students aspire to reach.
The visual evidence in Panels H and I of Figure 5 is again suggestive of positive eﬀects. Table 11 gives
the results of RD design estimates of the eﬀects of IPN admission on aspirations for undergraduate (ﬁrst
three columns) and graduate (last three) degrees. Although the estimates with the smaller bandwidth of 2
shows a positive eﬀect of 8 percentage points on the probability to aspire to an undergraduate education,
the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant and is not robust to the larger bandwidths (the point estimate
decreases to 2 points). The already high share of students who aspire for such education, about 90%,
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below the cutoﬀ, may explain this result.
However, there is evidence for a positive eﬀect on the probability to aspire to a graduate education,
with increases of 11 percentage points with the smaller bandwidth of 2 and about 18-19 points with the
two larger bandwidths, the latest two being signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This eﬀect is to be compared with
a share of about 57% aspiring to a graduate education. Thus, the eﬀects of admission to an IPN school
on the ﬁnancial gains from a college education seem to translate into higher educational aspirations.
While self-reported aspirations to reach a given attainment are likely an over-estimation of actual
enrollment decisions (and completion rates) at that schooling level, the declared intention to achieve a
certain schooling level may be informative of the likelihood of achieving the previous schooling level.
Hence the increase in aspirations for a graduate education eventually translate into a higher likelihood
of enrollment at the undergraduate level.
Besides, Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009), in an observational study of the relationship between per-
ceived returns and attainment among a sample of Mexican students ﬁnd that a one percentage point
increase in the expected college premium is associated with a .2 to .4 percentage point higher probability
(higher for boys) of attending college. These results are an average for the entire population and are
descriptive, so do not compare exactly with our estimates of the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE)
for the population of IPN applicants around the admission cutoﬀs. But causal eﬀects of such a magnitude
would imply that the increase in earnings expectations we found could translate into a higher probabil-
ity of college attendance of up to 4 to 8 percentage points. This estimate seems in the lower range of
the magnitude, but consistent with the eﬀects we obtain on aspirations for a graduate diploma and the
observed gap in college attendance of 34 percentage points between IPN and non-elite-school graduates
 reported in Table 2. This suggests that elite schools can aﬀect decisions to enroll at college and have
long-lasting consequences on individual outcomes.
5.5 Robustness checks
We examine the robustness of our results by adding a vector of baseline covariates as explanatory variables
in our econometric model. As in the case of experimental designs with random assignment to treatment
and control groups, in the absence of selective attrition (the main concern here) or manipulation of
treatment assignment, the inclusion of baseline covariates should not aﬀect the LATE estimates (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010).
We include controls for a vector of junior high school GPA deciles ﬁxed eﬀects, schooling in a private
junior high school, gender, parental education (indicator for whether at least one parent has senior
secondary education), and parental occupation (indicator for whether at least one parent has a white
collar job). This speciﬁcation aims in particular to control for junior high school GPA and past attendance
at a private junior high school, the only two variables for which there were some marginally signiﬁcant
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(at the 10% level) diﬀerences between IPN admittees and rejected candidates at follow-up. In this
speciﬁcation, we are comparing the outcomes of students within the same decile of junior high school
GPA or past schooling background that were marginally admitted and rejected from the IPN system. We
also include three control variables for the set of school choices stated during the Comipems allocation
process (although the local randomness of the IPN admission cutoﬀs should be orthogonal to those
choices).
Table 12 reports the RD design estimates with the controls for the set of outcomes examined above
for the bandwidth of 5. We obtain a similar set of results as before, with statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
of IPN admission on expected college premium, earnings expected with a college education, learning
achievement and aspirations for a graduate education, but no eﬀect on earnings expected with an high
school education. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients across the speciﬁcations are also very similar to the
ones reported in Tables 7 to 8 and 11. The results from our former RD design estimates thus are very
robust to the inclusion of those controls.
5.6 Peers versus school inputs: comparison with non-IPN elite schools
For understanding better what inputs make a diﬀerence on students' expected earnings and returns to
college and particularly if peers are a crucial input, we investigate the beneﬁts from admission into non-
IPN elite schools. As IPN schools are not the only selective ones in Mexico City, our empirical strategy
can serve also to estimate the eﬀects of admission into other selective public high schools. For this
purpose, we consider the set of non-IPN high schools with an admission cutoﬀ of 66 entry exam points
 the minimum for an IPN school  and deﬁne an admission cutoﬀ for each of these schools -we present
stacked results for this set of admission cutoﬀs to schools in diﬀerent systems. In the online appendix
we plot the average of the same school characteristics by distance to the cutoﬀ and Table 13 provides
the corresponding RD estimates. Admission into non-IPN elite high schools also provides access to peers
with higher (by more than .75 standard deviations) average achievement, but not to systematically better
other school inputs: although class sizes tend to be slightly smaller (by 2-3 students per class), those
schools do not provide better access to computers and their teachers work full time less often than in
other schools. So, these selective schools provide fewer inputs than the IPN ones.
In the online appendix we plot the averages of the main outcomes on the left and right of the cutoﬀ
for admission into non-IPN elite schools, and Table 14 gives the corresponding RD estimates. Admission
into such schools has no eﬀect on learning achievement at high school completion and does not either
aﬀect the returns students expect from a college education. The point estimates for the eﬀects on wages
expected with college are positive (of 6 to 12 percentage points), but these estimates are not statistically
signiﬁcant. Similarly, positive point estimates are found for the eﬀects on aspirations for further education
(undergraduate or graduate), but again the eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, non-IPN elite
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schools also provide access to scholastically better peers, but do not generate the same gains as IPN
schools. Our results suggest that IPN schools provide some speciﬁc inputs that do aﬀect both skills and
the returns students expect from college, and that those beneﬁts do not merely stem from interactions
with more carefully selected peers.23
6 Conclusions
In this article, we argue that the causal eﬀects of attending speciﬁc schools on wage expectations provide
a measure of the economic value that students receive from these schools (e.g. in form of augmented
skills, signaling and access to networks)  given that students are suﬃciently informed about the wages
they will be able to obtain in the future.24 We use this framework to examine the beneﬁts from attending
the IPN, a system of elite public schools in Mexico City metropolitan area. In this context, although
expected wages are high, reported expectations of returns to college compare well with basic econometric
estimates of wage returns to college, suggesting that lack of information is not prevalent.
We exploit data from a natural experiment to identify the eﬀect of attending an elite school system
on expected wages and returns to college education. The natural experiment arises from the allocation of
students into high schools based on a centralized exam, common to all public schools of the area; we com-
pare the outcomes of students just above and below IPN admission cutoﬀ scores. From a methodological
standpoint, while other studies use a related RD design framework (such as Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011),
and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013)) , our strategy departs by identifying the eﬀect of admission to an
elite school system compared to another school system, rather than admission to more and less selective
schools. This modiﬁed parameter of interest allows a more straightforward interpretation.
We ﬁnd that admission to an elite school system increases substantially the earnings and returns
students expect from a college education, with point estimates of the eﬀect of IPN admission on the
expected college premium of about 19 percentage points. Students who attend IPN schools thus attach
economic beneﬁts to the elite education they receive. But these students expect such beneﬁts only if
attending college  we ﬁnd no eﬀects on wages expected with only a high school degree. So the beneﬁts
that this elite school system produce seem to be more  or only  valuable in the labor market for
college graduates or as a complement for a college education. While we do not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of IPN admission on the intention to attend college  already around 90% of students
in the comparison group aspire to proceed to this level of schooling  we do ﬁnd that students admitted
to elite schools aspire to a graduate degree more often. The beneﬁts that IPN schools generate could
explain a share of the substantial diﬀerentials, that we document, in the college and labor market long-run
23We also examined heterogeneities by IPN school selectivity, splitting the set of IPN admission cutoﬀs into two subsets
corresponding to less and more selective IPN schools. These results (available upon request) show that the gains stem
mainly from admission to less selective IPN schools.
24While estimating the eﬀects of elite education on earnings would be an obvious alternative, it can be done only after
many years and requires long-run panel data that is not generally available.
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outcomes between IPN graduates and graduates of other non-elite public high schools.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the debate on elite schools by using a broader measure of the economic
beneﬁts from attending such a school. Supporting our interpretation of gains in expected wages as an
indication of school value-added, we ﬁnd that admission to the IPN system increases learning achievement
in mathematics at high school completion by about .3 standard deviations. This gain in learning conﬁrms
the capacity of the elite school system to combine inputs in a meaningful way.
We are also interested in the way school inputs shape student outcomes. Speciﬁcly, we investigate if
the access to higher achieving peers can explain the gains we observe. The IPN elite schools we study
provide to their students not only such peers, but also a number of better inputs, such as more qualiﬁed
teachers and better access to information technologies. Those inputs, and maybe other unobserved ones,
do make a diﬀerence. We compare the eﬀects of IPN and other equally selective schools in the city, which
also provide more selected peers but not better school inputs. We ﬁnd that the later do not generate
the same gains, suggesting that, beyond peers, the IPN schools provide speciﬁc inputs that matter. This
ﬁnding echoes with recent studies (for instance Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011)) that observe that schools
only providing interactions with peers who are more carefully selected and scholastically rigorous have
almost no eﬀect on students' learning.
Our results also shed light on the formation of the perceived the returns to college, which are important
determinants of decisions to enroll, as a growing literature shows. The ﬁnding of simultaneous gains in
skills and expected returns to college conﬁrms that students update their expectations as they accumulate
more human capital. But the gains in scholastic skills seem insuﬃcient to explain the increases in wage
expectations, and some partial evidence suggests that IPN schools also increase non-cognitive skills.
Although we do not provide direct evidence of it, IPN schools could also generate economic gains through
signaling or access to networks. On the other hand, and diﬀerently from other studies (e.g. Jensen (2010),
and Battaglia and Lebedinski (2013)), our results do not lend support to a pure informational or role
model mechanism in the formation of perceived returns to college. In particular, we ﬁnd no higher
eﬀects on the expectations of students from more disadvantaged background, the ones most likely to have
inordinately low expectations due to lack of information.
These results have a potential use to policymakers: information on expected wages  and other
expectations regarding future employment, for example  could be used systematically as outcomes to
evaluate school quality, as a complement to measures of scholastic learning. In addition, while much
attention has been devoted to the eﬀects of diﬀerent school environments on scholastic learning, our
results suggest that schools may help students build other (cognitive or non-cognitive) skills that have
value either on the labor market or in a college education. Identifying more precisely those skills and
what features in the environment of elite schools produce them is key for the analysis of educational
policies.
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Tables
Table 1: Student Characteristics and School Inputs
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Other Schools IPN Schools
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Junior high GPA -0.0636 0.711
(0.982) (1.011)
Private junior high 0.0313 0.118
(0.174) (0.323)
Female 0.517 0.333
(0.500) (0.471)
No. Choices submitted 8.873 9.347
(3.580) (3.772)
IPN Schools in top 10 choices 0.659 4.196
(1.266) (2.329)
High Demand Schools in top 10 choices 2.551 3.305
(2.219) (2.041)
At least one parent has high school 0.269 0.487
(0.444) (0.500)
At least one parent is white-collar 0.204 0.368
(0.403) (0.482)
Observations 176,760 19,042
Panel B: School Inputs
School Entry Score -0.146 1.677
(0.542) (0.434)
SD of School Entry Score 0.663 0.516
(0.129) (0.0905)
Class Size 41.56 39.59
(6.254) (2.782)
Students per PC 9.779 3.521
(13.62) (1.133)
Share Teachers with College 0.807 0.856
(0.125) (0.133)
Share Full-Time Teachers 0.135 0.287
(0.184) (0.0952)
Observations 593 16
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics
of students (Panel A) and school inputs (Panel B) for the samples of
students admitted to IPN (2nd column) and other (1st column) public
high schools. Other schools do not include UNAM schools. Source:
COMIPEMS 2005 and schools census data.
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Table 2: Short-Run and Long-Run Outcomes and IPN Graduation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Language Attended Active in Unem- ln Hourly ln Hourly ln Hourly
VARIABLES Score Score College Labor Market ployment Wage Wage Wage
IPN Graduate 1.382*** 0.989*** 0.342*** 0.135*** -0.0622** 0.509*** 0.587*** 0.214*
(0.0829) (0.0766) (0.0516) (0.0388) (0.0312) (0.0852) (0.104) (0.116)
Female -0.280*** 0.175*** -0.0614 -0.190*** -0.0231 -0.145** -0.119* -0.111
(0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0399) (0.0297) (0.0252) (0.0661) (0.0719) (0.103)
Age 0.00354 -0.0166 -0.0866 0.195 0.361** -0.0794
(0.00628) (0.0747) (0.0640) (0.168) (0.181) (0.267)
Age Squared 0.000323 0.00158 -0.00289 -0.00593* 0.00244
(0.00132) (0.00113) (0.00297) (0.00319) (0.00472)
Observations 81,415 81,415 568 568 475 292 179 113
R-squared 0.236 0.104 0.081 0.096 0.016 0.159 0.192 0.165
Sample Enlace Enlace Entelems Entelems Entelems Entelems Only HS College
Mean Non-IPN -0.158 -0.101 0.324 0.812 0.0773
Notes: OLS estimates of partial correlations between IPN graduation and several short and long-run outcomes, including:
scores at high-school completion achievement test (columns (1)-(2)), college attendance (column (3)), labor market partic-
ipation (column (4)), unemployment (column (5)), hourly wages (column (6)-(8)). Columns (1)-(2): The sample comprises
respondents from the 2008 and 2009 ENLACE achievement survey. Columns (3)-(8): The sample comprises respondents
from the module ENTELEMS attached to the National Labour Force Survey of the third quarter of 2008. Estimation
is restricted to individuals 23 to 35 years old who graduated from a public high school from the Federal District (D.F.)
and the State of Mexico in localities larger than 100,000 inhabitants. Graduates from UNAM high schools are excluded.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3
3
ha
ls
hs
-0
09
51
76
3,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
6 
Fe
b 
20
14
Table 3: Partial Correlations: Earnings Expectations and IPN Attendance
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Implied Premium Earnings HS (ln) Earnings College (ln)
IPN student 0.0569*** 0.0194 0.0764***
(0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0125)
High school score 0.0485*** -0.0256*** 0.0229***
(0.00600) (0.00526) (0.00455)
Entry exam Score -0.00524 0.0353*** 0.0301***
(0.00554) (0.00554) (0.00479)
Junior high GPA 0.00625** -0.0115*** -0.00520*
(0.00247) (0.00314) (0.00267)
Private junior high 0.0211* 0.0367*** 0.0578***
(0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0106)
At least one parent has high school 0.0162*** 0.0174*** 0.0336***
(0.00603) (0.00663) (0.00512)
At least one parent is white-collar 0.0199*** -0.0188** 0.00112
(0.00685) (0.00778) (0.00590)
Asset Index 0.00897*** 0.0190*** 0.0280***
(0.00260) (0.00318) (0.00258)
Female 0.0823*** -0.0483*** 0.0340***
(0.00579) (0.00617) (0.00633)
Indigenous Origin -0.0119 -0.0126 -0.0246**
(0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0113)
Constant 0.681*** 8.816*** 9.497***
(0.00648) (0.00655) (0.00597)
Observations 44,064 44,064 44,064
R-squared 0.026 0.009 0.037
Notes: OLS estimates of partial correlations between IPN school attendance (and individual charac-
teristics) and expected college premium (Column (1)), wages with senior high-school (Column (2))
and college (Column (3)) degrees. Outcomes are logs of expected earnings with college and high
school and ratio (returns). The sample includes 12th graders in public high schools of Mexico City
Metropolitan Area who answered the Enlace Survey in 2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the school level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Balance of Covariates at Baseline Assignment to Schools and end of High School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assignment Assignment Assignment End End End
EQUATION VARIABLES [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10]
JHS GPA Admitted -0.144 0.0111 0.0448 0.0275 0.112 0.158**
(0.101) (0.0494) (0.0526) (0.138) (0.0771) (0.0797)
Private JHS Admitted -0.0421 -0.0171 -0.00900 0.0357 0.0340 0.0443
(0.0425) (0.0238) (0.0227) (0.0624) (0.0304) (0.0316)
Female Admitted -0.0768 0.00537 0.00215 -0.128 -0.0337 -0.0461
(0.0611) (0.0329) (0.0376) (0.0997) (0.0471) (0.0548)
Number of Choices Admitted 0.710 -0.171 -0.145 0.767 -0.208 -0.0679
(0.527) (0.301) (0.302) (0.786) (0.407) (0.425)
IPN in Top 10 Admitted -0.0730 -0.226 -0.171 0.417 -0.0178 0.0197
(0.308) (0.160) (0.170) (0.306) (0.184) (0.198)
High Demand in Top 10 Admitted 0.225 -0.0774 -0.00817 0.418 0.269 0.227
(0.268) (0.171) (0.184) (0.439) (0.210) (0.242)
One Parent has SHS Admitted 0.341 -0.00162 0.153 0.617 0.0982 0.150
(0.309) (0.178) (0.183) (0.412) (0.220) (0.239)
One Parent is White Collar Admitted 0.338 0.120 0.223 0.0666 0.0493 -0.00310
(0.333) (0.171) (0.181) (0.523) (0.232) (0.252)
Observations 1,359 3,206 6,356 631 1,541 3,142
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 208 277 344 153 216 287
chi2 7.291 5.251 3.496 9.253 6.217 11.71
Prob > chi2 0.506 0.730 0.900 0.321 0.623 0.165
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three columns, of the discontinuities
associated with IPN admission in a set of covariates, i.e. junior high school GPA, attendance of a private junior high school,
gender, number of school choices submitted in the COMIPEMPS allocation process, number of IPN schools and high demand
schools in top 10 choices, high school graduate and white collar parent. All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted
with the control function. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005
and ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: (1-3) regular applicants from D.F. junior high schools to IPN schools observed at
COMIPEMS test taking and (4-6) Enlace test taking.
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Table 5: RD Design Estimates: Enlace-taking at end of high school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES End of HS End of HS End of HS Surveyee Surveyee Surveyee
Admitted -0.0398 -0.0362 -0.0496 0.0356 0.0210 0.00386
(0.0633) (0.0339) (0.0375) (0.0706) (0.0392) (0.0400)
Observations 1,359 3,206 6,356 1,359 3,206 6,356
R-squared 0.028 0.015 0.014 0.035 0.015 0.020
Bandwidth [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10]
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 208 277 344 208 277 344
Mean Non-Admitted 0.487 0.507 0.509 0.337 0.349 0.337
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three columns,
of discontinuities associated with IPN admission in the probabilities of taking the Enlace exam
(columns (1) - (3)) and the Enlace Survey (columns (4) - (6)) in 2008 or 2009. All models include
cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005. Sample: regular applicants from D.F.
junior high to IPN schools observed at COMIPEMS test taking.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: School Inputs
EQUATION VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
School Entry Score Admitted 1.125*** 1.136*** 1.117***
(0.110) (0.0657) (0.0671)
SD School Entry Score Admitted -0.00736 0.00801 0.00878
(0.0319) (0.0209) (0.0221)
Class Size Admitted -0.109 -1.714** -1.273
(1.238) (0.779) (0.856)
Students per PC Admitted -6.918*** -7.921*** -7.698***
(1.311) (0.870) (0.849)
Teachers with College Admitted 0.0979*** 0.0818*** 0.0888***
(0.0276) (0.0185) (0.0201)
Full Time Teachers Admitted 0.173*** 0.112*** 0.115***
(0.0380) (0.0221) (0.0263)
Observations 467 1,107 2,176
Bandwidth [2] [5] [10]
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 123 175 232
chi2 302.8 916.1 806.5
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in
the three columns, of the eﬀects of IPN admission on received school inputs, i.e.:
school peers' entry scores: mean and standard deviation, class size, number of
students per computer, share of teachers with a college degree, share of teachers
employed full time in the school. All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully
interacted with the control function. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005, ENLACE 2008 and
2009, Census of schools. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to
IPN schools observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: RD Design Estimates: Expected Earnings and Returns to College
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Expected Expected Expected
HS HS HS College College College return return return
VARIABLES [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10]
Admitted 0.0113 -0.0610 -0.0361 0.231** 0.116** 0.152*** 0.220* 0.177*** 0.189***
(0.123) (0.0559) (0.0621) (0.0920) (0.0470) (0.0493) (0.123) (0.0604) (0.0608)
Observations 470 1,115 2,184 470 1,115 2,184 470 1,115 2,184
R-squared 0.024 0.031 0.022 0.036 0.047 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.028
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 125 179 236 125 179 236 125 179 236
Mean Non-Admitted 8.863 8.815 8.790 9.561 9.555 9.564 0.698 0.740 0.774
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three columns, of the eﬀects of IPN admission
on expected wages with high school (columns (1)-(3)) and college (columns (4)-(6)), and on expected returns to college (columns (7) -
(9)). Outcomes are logs of expected earnings with college and high school (columns (1)-(6)) and ratio of logs of expected earnings with
college and high school (columns (7) - (9)). All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005, ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: regular
applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: RD Design Estimates: Student Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math Math Language Language Language
VARIABLES Score Score Score Score Score Score
Admitted 0.300** 0.343*** 0.313*** 0.0530 0.0790 0.0828
(0.138) (0.0856) (0.0948) (0.170) (0.0983) (0.0920)
Observations 470 1,115 2,184 470 1,115 2,183
R-squared 0.181 0.145 0.210 0.088 0.072 0.127
Bandwidth [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10]
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 125 179 236 125 179 236
Mean Non-Admitted 0.285 0.262 0.143 0.181 0.127 0.0820
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three
columns, of the eﬀects of IPN admission on achievement in Mathematics (columns (1)-(3)) and
Spanish (columns (4)-(6)). Outcomes are standardized test-scores at Enlace high-school com-
pletion exam. All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS
2005, ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools
observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: RD Design Estimates: Non-Cognitive Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self Self Self Attitude Attitude Attitude
VARIABLES Organization Organization Organization to School to School to School
Admitted 0.180 0.0340 0.0578 0.169 0.253** 0.242*
(0.220) (0.126) (0.139) (0.228) (0.119) (0.125)
Observations 454 1,069 2,091 454 1,070 2,097
R-squared 0.047 0.020 0.028 0.040 0.027 0.032
Bandwidth [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10]
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 121 177 234 122 177 234
Mean Non-Admitted -0.0769 -0.00694 0.00408 -0.0898 -0.0340 0.0166
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three columns, of
the eﬀects of IPN admission on two indexes of non-cognitive skills: self-organization (columns (1)-(3)) and
attitude to school (columns (4)-(6)). Outcomes are indexes based on principal component analysis and are
normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted
with the control function. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source:
COMIPEMS 2005, ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools
observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: RD Design Estimates: Treatment Eﬀects by Student Character-
istics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
College Wage Wage Math Language
VARIABLES Premium HS College Score Score
Admitted 0.170*** -0.0331 0.137*** 0.349*** 0.0288
(0.0597) (0.0552) (0.0497) (0.0930) (0.106)
One Parent has High School 0.0731 -0.000287 0.0728 -0.0533 -0.0679
(0.0639) (0.0653) (0.0580) (0.100) (0.0923)
Interaction 0.0339 -0.0872 -0.0533 -5.35e-05 0.130
(0.0467) (0.0539) (0.0439) (0.0841) (0.0868)
Observations 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115
R-squared 0.057 0.047 0.055 0.149 0.085
Bandwidth [5] [5] [5] [5] [5]
Control Fn Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Clusters 179 179 179 179 179
Mean Non-Admitted 0.749 8.775 9.524 0.277 0.138
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidth of 5 and interaction terms, of hetero-
geneities, by parental education in the eﬀects of IPN admission on expected returns to
college and wages (columns (1)-(3)) and scores at ENLACE exam (columns (4)-(5)). All
models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005,
ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools
observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: RD Design Estimates: Aspirations to Further Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES College College College Grad School Grad School Grad School
Admitted 0.0808 0.0245 0.0262 0.110 0.177*** 0.191***
(0.0604) (0.0326) (0.0386) (0.113) (0.0519) (0.0545)
Observations 470 1,115 2,183 470 1,115 2,183
R-squared 0.110 0.042 0.034 0.095 0.056 0.047
Bandwidth [2] [5] [10] [2] [5] [10]
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 125 179 236 125 179 236
Mean Non-Admitted 0.902 0.882 0.885 0.573 0.586 0.591
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three columns, of the
eﬀects of IPN admission on declared aspirations to attend college (columns (1)-(3)) and graduate school
(columns (4)-(6)). All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005,
ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools observed in
ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: RD Design Estimates: Robustness to Controls for Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Expected Expected Expected Score Score Aspires Aspires
VARIABLES Return Wage HS Wage College Math Language College Grad School
Admitted 0.196*** -0.0924 0.103** 0.336*** 0.0161 0.0266 0.149**
(0.0615) (0.0563) (0.0503) (0.0846) (0.105) (0.0318) (0.0577)
Observations 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115
R-squared 0.186 0.161 0.188 0.324 0.260 0.243 0.243
Bandwidth [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5]
Control Fn Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Clusters 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
Baseline Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean Non-Admitted 0.740 8.815 9.555 0.262 0.127 0.882 0.586
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidth of 5 and controlling for a set of baseline covariates, of the eﬀects of
IPN admission on previous outcomes. Covariates include a vector of dummies for junior high-GPA deciles, dummies
for graduation from a private junior high, gender, whether at least one parent has high school education, whether at
least one parent has a white-collar occuppation and whether the student took the UNAM version of the entry exam,
the number of IPN schools submitted in their top 10 choices, the number of highly selective schools submitted in
their top ten choices, the number of schools submitted in their choice set and an index for household assets. All
models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function and the baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Source: COMIPEMS 2005, ENLACE 2008 and
2009. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Non-IPN Elite Schools  School Inputs
EQUATION VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
School Entry Score Admitted 0.726*** 0.754*** 0.714***
(0.148) (0.108) (0.109)
SD School Entry Score Admitted -0.0618* -0.0663*** -0.0781***
(0.0335) (0.0253) (0.0269)
Class Size Admitted -2.560* -2.590*** -2.917***
(1.426) (0.844) (0.855)
Students per PC Admitted 5.762*** 2.502* 1.247
(1.967) (1.322) (1.383)
Teachers with College Admitted 0.0284 0.0134 0.0150
(0.0317) (0.0190) (0.0181)
Full Time Teachers Admitted -0.209*** -0.0592* -0.0347
(0.0521) (0.0326) (0.0325)
Observations 206 559 1,229
Bandwidth [2] [5] [10]
Control Fn Linear Linear Quadratic
Clusters 54 102 156
chi2 56.30 65.29 56.67
Prob > chi2 2.54e-10 0 2.13e-10
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in
the three columns, of the eﬀects of admission to non-IPN selective high schools
on received school inputs, i.e.: school peers' entry scores: mean and standard
deviation, class size, number of students per computer, share of teachers with
a college degree, share of teachers employed full time in the school. All models
include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with the control function. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Source:
COMIPEMS 2005, ENLACE 2008 and 2009, Census of schools. Sample: regular
applicants from D.F. junior high to non-IPN selective high schools observed in
ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Non-IPN Elite Schools  Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
End of College Wage Wage Math Language Aspires Aspires
VARIABLES HS Premium HS College Score Score College Grad School
Admitted -0.0287 0.106 -0.0451 0.0612 0.134 0.0203 0.0707 0.0246
(0.0436) (0.0844) (0.0875) (0.0812) (0.125) (0.143) (0.0588) (0.0813)
Observations 2,152 563 563 563 563 563 562 562
R-squared 0.012 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.081 0.081 0.030 0.022
Bandwidth [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5]
Control Fn Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Clusters 2022 540 540 540 540 540 539 539
Mean Non-Admitted 0.464 0.783 8.765 9.548 0.165 0.201 0.894 0.647
Notes: RD design estimates, using the bandwidths of respectively 2, 5 and 10 in the three columns, of the eﬀects
of admission to non-IPN selective high schools on students' outcomes, i.e. completion of high school (column (1)),
expected returns to college and wages (columns (2)-(4)) and scores at ENLACE exam (columns (5)-(6)), aspirations to
attend undergraduate and graduate school (columns (7)-(8)). All models include cutoﬀ ﬁxed eﬀects fully interacted with
the control function. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Source: COMIPEMS
2005, ENLACE 2008 and 2009, Census of schools. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior high to non-IPN
selective high schools observed in ENLACE survey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figures
Figure 1: Local means of expected returns to college and earnings
Notes: Conditional means, by decile of high school completion (ENLACE) achievement test, of expectations of
earnings returns to college (Panel A) (with 95% conﬁdence interval) and wages expected with high school and
college degrees (Panel B) of students of IPN and other public high schools. Source: ENLACE 2008 and 2009
surveys. Sample: 3rd year high school students of Mexico City public high schools.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the distance of students' scores from IPN admission cutoﬀs at assignment to
and end of high school
Notes: Distribution of the distance of students' scores at the COMIPEMS entry exam and from their cutoﬀ scores
for admission into the IPN system. Source: COMIPEMS 2005 school choices and entry exam scores. Sample: (a)
regular applicants from Federal District junior high schools to COMIPEMS public high schools and (B) individuals
from the same group observed at ENLACE high school completion achievement test.
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Figure 3: Means of individual characteristics by distance from IPN admission cutoﬀs
Notes: Conditional means of measures of students' characteristics (junior high school GPA, attendance of a private
junior high school, gender, number of school choices submitted in the COMIPEMPS allocation process, number of
IPN schools and high demand schools in top 10 choices, high school graduate and white collar parent) by distance
of IPN entry exam test score from IPN admission cutoﬀ. Source: COMIPEMS 2005. Sample: regular applicants
from Federal District junior high to IPN schools.
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Figure 4: Means of school inputs by distance from IPN admission cutoﬀs
Notes: Conditional means of measures of school inputs (school peers' entry scores: mean and standard deviation, class size,
number of students per computer, share of teachers with a college degree, share of teachers employed full time in the school)
by distance of IPN entry exam test score from IPN admission cutoﬀ. Source: COMIPEMS 2005, Census of schools. Sample:
regular applicants from D.F. junior high to IPN schools observed at ENLACE high school completion achievement test.
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Figure 5: Means of student outcomes by distance from IPN admission cutoﬀs
Notes: Conditional means of measures of students' outcomes (expected returns to college, expected wages with high school
and college degree, scores in Mathematics and Spanish at ENLACE high school completion exam, indexes of attitude toward
school and self-organization, aspiration for an undergraduate and graduate diploma) by distance of IPN entry exam test score
from IPN admission cutoﬀ. Source: COMIPEMS 2005, ENLACE 2008 and 2009. Sample: regular applicants from D.F. junior
high to IPN schools observed at ENLACE high school completion achievement test (and, for all outcomes except test scores,
responding the ENLACE survey) .
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